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AbsTrACT
Objective Conflicting evidence exists regarding the 
impact of financial incentives on encouraging attendance 
at medical screening appointments. The primary aim 
was to determine whether financial incentives increase 
attendance at diabetic eye screening in persistent non-
attenders.
Methods and analysis A three-armed randomised 
controlled trial was conducted in London in 2015. 1051 
participants aged over 16 years, who had not attended 
eye screening appointments for 2 years or more, were 
randomised (1.4:1:1 randomisation ratio) to receive 
the usual invitation letter (control), an offer of £10 
cash for attending screening (fixed incentive) or a 1 in 
100 chance of winning £1000 (lottery incentive) if they 
attend. The primary outcome was the proportion of 
invitees attending screening, and a comparative analysis 
was performed to assess group differences. Pairwise 
comparisons of attendance rates were performed, using 
a conservative Bonferroni correction for independent 
comparisons.
results 34/435 (7.8%) of control, 17/312 (5.5%) of 
fixed incentive and 10/304 (3.3%) of lottery incentive 
groups attended. Participants who received any incentive 
were significantly less likely to attend their appointment 
compared with controls (risk ratio (RR)=0.56; 95% CI 
0.34 to 0.92). Those in the probabilistic incentive group 
(RR=0.42; 95% CI 0.18 to 0.98), but not the fixed 
incentive group (RR=1.66; 95% CI 0.65 to 4.21), were 
significantly less likely to attend than those in the control 
group.
Conclusion Financial incentives, particularly lottery-
based incentives, attract fewer patients to diabetic 
eye screening than standard invites in this population. 
Financial incentives should not be used to promote 
screening unless tested in context, as they may 
negatively affect attendance rates.
InTrOduCTIOn
Diabetes and its complications costs the 
National Health Service (NHS) over £10 billion 
annually, representing 10% of the NHS budget 
for England and Wales.1 These costs exclude indi-
rect costs to the UK economy, including absen-
teeism, early retirement and social benefits. Costs 
are expected to rise given trends of rising diabetes 
prevalence.
Diabetic retinopathy is a leading cause of sight 
loss in the UK working population2 and is associ-
ated with 1280 new cases of blindness annually.3 
The diabetic eye screening (DES) programme iden-
tifies early stages of retinopathy, before symptoms 
develop and sight loss occurs, to enable effective 
treatment. The uptake rate for DES is 83% (2015–
2016).4 Therefore, many with diabetes are not 
screened and at risk of avoidable sight loss.
While screening programmes such as DES are 
beneficial overall, they can potentially exacerbate 
health inequalities. In the UK, diabetes preva-
lence increases with increasing deprivation, while 
diabetic retinopathy screening attendance decreases 
and the prevalence of sight-threatening retinopathy 
among screened patients increases.5 Cost-effective 
strategies are required to increase screening uptake, 
particularly in those most at risk.
One strategy gaining popularity is financial 
incentives to encourage healthy behaviours.6 There 
are many examples where financial incentives have 
significantly changed behaviour at a relatively low 
cost. However, applying principles from behavioural 
economics can increase effectiveness, as the incen-
tive structure can affect their impact.7 Financial 
incentives may also be more effective at influencing 
infrequent health behaviours, such as vaccination 
uptake, rather than producing sustained behaviour 
change, for example, smoking cessation.8 There-
fore, incentives may be an effective and cost-effec-
tive strategy to promote screening uptake. Financial 
incentives have not previously been investigated in 
a randomised trial of DES uptake.
The primary objective was to test whether finan-
cial incentives increase attendance in persistent 
non-attenders. Secondary objectives included 
whether the design of the incentive scheme influ-
ences its effectiveness and whether patients 
attending DES from the incentive groups were from 
a different sociodemographic background than the 
control group.
MeThOds
This study was registered with the International 
Standard Randomised Controlled Trial Number 
registry (ISRCTN14896403). The report for the 
funder (National Institute for Health Research) 
is available online,9 and justification of the inter-
vention conditions can be found in the published 
protocol.10
Trial design
The Incentives in Diabetic Eye Assessment by 
Screening (IDEAS) trial was a three-arm randomised 
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controlled trial, with a 1.4:1:1 ratio between the control, fixed 
incentive and lottery incentive groups, respectively. Participants 
were sent a standard appointment letter inviting them to attend 
a DES appointment at a fixed time.
Participants
Eligible participants were diabetic patients, aged 16 years or 
over, from general practitioner (GP) practices in Kensington, 
Chelsea and Westminster, who had been invited to annual eye 
screening in the last 24 months but had failed to attend or rear-
range a subsequent appointment.
Participants were identified from the 1st Retinal Screening 
Ltd database, a contracted company responsible for screening in 
the area, on the 12 March 2015. The normal, annual invitation 
process continued for trial participants. A minimum period of 
2 months was left between appointment letters sent as usual care 
and appointment letters for the trial to ensure that no patient 
was enrolled who was late to contact the screening service but 
intended to do so. Before letters were sent, participant details 
were checked against the GP patient register to check address 
details and so that patients who had become ineligible were not 
invited.
Procedure
Eligible participants were sent a standard appointment invitation 
letter 4 weeks before their appointment, with or without incen-
tive (according to randomisation). Clinic dates were alternated 
between the three conditions, (interspersed with extra control 
clinics given the larger group size) to control for any seasonal 
variability in attendance. Participants could reschedule this 
appointment once and remain eligible for the incentive.
Dedicated IDEAS clinics were arranged within St Mary’s 
hospital, London, (between 19 March and 20 August 2015) 
separately for each trial condition to ensure participant blinding 
to the different incentive conditions. At the end of the study, 
anonymised demographic and screening attendance data were 
collected from the central database.
Interventions
The design of the financial incentives took into account estab-
lished psychological phenomenon from Kahneman’s Prospect 
Theory.11 The incentive vouchers included expiry dates (the 
screening date) to introduce an aspect of ‘loss aversion’, whereby 
losing a reward is more powerful than gaining a reward.12
Control
Participants received a standard letter from the screening service, 
inviting them to an appointment on a fixed date and time. A 
telephone number was provided for patients to rearrange their 
appointment if necessary.
Fixed incentive
Participants received the standard invitation letter as in the 
control group, with the inclusion of additional text and a voucher 
offering a financial incentive of £10 for attending screening 
(figure 1). £10 was chosen considering the concept of reference 
points—offering a small incentive encourages people to collect 
test results, but increasing the value has little effect.13 £10 was 
estimated to cover patients’ time or travel cost.
Lottery incentive
Participants received the standard invitation letter, including addi-
tional text and a voucher offering entry into a prize draw with a 1 
in 100 chance of winning £1000 following screening (figure 2). 
This condition was designed considering the phenomena that 
people overvalue small probabilities, explaining the popularity 
of lotteries and insurance.11 Given limited resources in an incen-
tive programme, offering a chance of winning a lottery may be 
more effective than smaller individual rewards.14 The lottery 
probability was chosen so that it would be easy to comprehend,7 
Figure 1  Image of voucher and supplementary text added to the invitation letter for the fixed incentive group.
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and the value was chosen so that the ‘expected value’ was equiv-
alent for both incentive conditions (100% chance of winning 
£10 versus a 1% chance of winning £1000).
Outcomes
The primary outcome was screening attendance. Secondary 
outcome measures included the demographic profile of partici-
pants attending and not attending their appointment. Data were 
available on: Indices of Multiple Deprivation15 (IMD) (a measure 
of deprivation level based on small geographic areas, obtained 
through postcode data); straight line distance from the address 
to the screening centre; and number of years registered with the 
service. Data were presented as deciles for age and deprivation 
to maintain patient confidentiality.
The follow-up action recommended from screening, aggre-
gated by treatment group, was a further outcome. This was 
converted into a binary score of ‘no additional management 
required’ versus ‘additional management required’.
randomisation and blinding
To generate the random allocation sequence, the data manager 
at 1st Retinal Screen Ltd provided the team statistician with a 
spreadsheet containing deidentified/anonymised patient data. 
For 1274 eligible patients provided in the list, participants were 
indexed according to numbers generated at random using a stan-
dard random number generator, with double precision, to avoid 
duplicates. Participants were then sorted from smallest to largest 
according to this random index. Within the sorted list and using 
the 1.4:1:1 randomisation ratio, the team statistician assigned: 
(1) the lowest 375 participants to the fixed incentive group; 
(2) the following 375 participants to the probabilistic incentive 
group; and (3) the remainder of the participants (ie, 524) to the 
control group. Due to this method of anonymised patient iden-
tifiers being allocated to groups by the trial statistician prior to 
the start of the study, there was no issue resulting from lack of 
concealment of the intervention sequence.
Given two intervention groups, each compared with a control, 
maximum statistical efficiency is achieved using a 1.4:1:1 rando-
misation ratio.16
Given the designated clinics for each trial condition, it was 
not possible for the researcher (who was present at intervention 
clinics to administer the incentive) or the screener to be blinded 
to group assignment. However, as screening attendance is the 
primary outcome, the results could not be biased by the lack of 
blinding at this stage.
sample size
As a group of persistent non-attenders, attendance in the control 
group was expected to be extremely low at 1%, with a 10% 
increase in attendance considered clinically significant. This was 
deemed feasible given other financial incentive studies, where 
smoking cessation rates among employees increased from 5% 
to 14.7%,17 and warfarin adherence improved from 65% to 
97.8%.18 Given the primary analysis of a single test comparing the 
control group to the combined incentive groups, and assuming 
a 10% increase in attendance with the intervention, a total 
sample size of approximately 350 would achieve at least 95% 
power. The study was also powered for the secondary analysis of 
investigating whether there are differences in attendance given 
the different incentive conditions. To detect the same minimal 
clinically important difference of 10% (attendance increasing 
from 1% in the control group to 11% in an intervention group) 
with at least 95% power and a Bonferroni correction for the 
multiple comparisons in the secondary analysis, there would be 
95% power with 1000 participants (412 in the control group 
and 294 in each intervention group). Should attendance in the 
control group be 5%, the study would still have approximately 
85% power to detect a 10% increase in attendance to 15%.
Analysis
Differences in demographic profile between randomised groups 
were calculated using χ2 analysis. For the primary analysis, a 
Figure 2  Image of voucher and supplementary text added to the invitation letter for the lottery incentive group.
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comparative analysis was performed, comparing attendance 
in the control group to the fixed and lottery incentive groups 
combined.
For secondary analyses, pairwise comparisons of attendance 
rates (absolute risk differences) were performed between control 
versus fixed incentive, control versus lottery incentive and fixed 
versus lottery incentive groups, adjusting for multiple compari-
sons using a Bonferroni correction.
The sociodemographic characteristics were compared 
between trial attenders and non-attenders, as well as attenders 
from control and incentive groups. Binary categories were used 
for age (above or below 65 years) and IMD (0–20 vs 30–60) 
when assessing differences by treatment group.
Group differences in the proportion of patients attending who 
require additional management following screening was assessed 
using χ2 analysis.
To explore whether incentive schemes attract patients with 
a different socioeconomic or demographic status, a backward 
stepwise multivariate logistic regression was performed to adjust 
the treatment effect by the demographic covariates. The statis-
tical analysis plan (prepared in advance of the trial analysis) is 
shown as supplementary material.
resulTs
One thousand two hundred seventy-four patients were eligible 
and randomised. Between the randomisation date and patients 
being sent invitation letters, 223 became ineligible. Therefore, 
1051 participants were sent an invitation letter and included in 
the analysis (n=435 control; n=312 fixed; n=304 lottery). The 
trial flow diagram is shown in figure 3. No harms occurred.
The primary reasons for ineligibility before being sent an 
appointment invitation letter were: attendance at annual DES 
appointment (44.4% of ineligible patients) and moving out of 
the area (22.4%). The loss of patients did not affect the sample 
size target or predefined ratio. There were no group differences 
in reasons for ineligibility (p=0.736). The demographic profile 
of participants is shown in table 1.
Sixty-one participants attended screening (5.8% of those 
invited). Thirty-four participants (7.8%) attended from the 
control arm and 27 participants (4.4%) from the two incentive 
arms combined. Table 2 shows pairwise comparisons of atten-
dance rate by treatment group. Those in an incentive group 
were 44% less likely to attend screening compared with controls 
(RR=0.56; 95% CI 0.34 to 0.92).
Seventeen participants (5.5%) attended from the fixed incen-
tive arm, and 10 participants (3.3%) from the lottery arm. 
Those in the lottery arm were 58% less likely to attend screening 
compared with control participants (RR=0.42; 95% CI 0.18 to 
0.98).
The sociodemographic characteristics of trial attenders and 
non-attenders for each group is shown in table 3. There were 
no significant differences in sociodemographic characteristics 
between attenders and non-attenders. No significant differ-
ences were found among trial attenders between the control 
and incentive groups. There was no difference between incen-
tive and control groups in terms of outcome recommendation 
Figure 3  Trial participant flow diagram.
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from screening (p=0.387). Multivariate analysis to determine 
the covariate-adjusted differences in attendance rates between 
groups demonstrated that none of the sociodemographic factors 
impacted on attendance.
dIsCussIOn
In this randomised controlled trial, financial incentives were not 
effective at improving uptake at DES clinics targeting persistent 
non-attenders. Contrary to expectations based on the theoretical 
application of behavioural economics, those who received an 
incentive offer were significantly less likely to attend screening 
than those who received a standard appointment invitation only. 
In addition, we found no evidence that the sociodemographic 
profile or screening outcome of patients attending following an 
incentive offer was any different to those attending following the 
standard appointment invitation.
While it was observed that those in an intervention group 
were statistically significantly less likely to attend than those in 
the control group, it should be noted that the effect size was 
small and not clinically significant, and this finding may not be 
generalisable due to the high ethnic diversity of the study popu-
lation. Therefore, while there is strong evidence that the incen-
tive did not increase DES attendance, it may not be correct to 
conclude that financial incentives would be expected to signifi-
cantly reduce uptake in other contexts.
Participants were well matched between groups in terms 
of demographic factors; however, participants were from 
the most deprived and hard-to-reach populations overall. A 
percentage of 52.9 of participants were in the bottom three 
IMD deciles. These patients with diabetes were consistently 
not attending despite 60% of trial participants being registered 
for at least 6 years in the Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster 
DES programme. It is of great importance that this high-risk, 
non-attending group is screened. Previous studies in deprived 
populations have shown financial incentives to be particularly 
effective.19 In this trial, which included deprived participants, 
incentives were ineffective at increasing retinopathy screening 
participation and the incentive offer was associated with lower 
screening uptake, especially in the lottery group.
Patients with diabetes often feel well and may only be driven 
to attend health appointments after significant health events. 
It is possible that the target population have not experienced 
health events prompting them to recognise the importance of 
screening. Alternatively, there may be additional barriers such as 
lack of knowledge, inconvenience and fear of medical interven-
tion that cannot be overcome by a simple financial incentive.20 
However, this does not explain why incentives appear to lead to 
a decrease in DES attendance.
Incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation,21 but this does 
not explain the findings, since these patients have not attended 
appointments for at least 2 years. A possible reason for the nega-
tive effect may be that an incentive elicits feelings of dread. The 
financial incentive may have reinforced an already established 
perception that screening is unpleasant or painful. Offering 
payments for tasks leads individuals to report that the expe-
rience is more unpleasant when doing the same task for little 
or no payment,22 23 possibly as payment is perceived as recom-
pense for a bad experience. The participants in this trial were a 
particularly hard-to-reach group, perhaps as they already believe 
eye screening is an aversive experience. Therefore, they may be 
prone to interpret incentives as a signal of danger. Alternatively, 
the voucher may have been perceived as junk mail and ignored.
An observational study in the USA also questions the effective-
ness of incentives in DES. Predictors of DES rates were assessed 
by analysing healthcare claims, and incentives (both provider and 
patient incentives of $25) were associated with lower screening 
rates.24
There are some limitations and potential sources of bias in this 
study. Participants were identified through health records that 
may be incorrect. However, all possible attempts were made to 
ensure patients included were alive, living at the address listed 
and eligible for screening. Second, trial participants were invited 
to a screening centre further from their home than would be 
Table 1  Demographics of patients included in the trial
Overall 
invited IdeAs 
participants 
(n=1051)
Control
(n=435)
Fixed
(n=312)
lottery
(n=304)
Gender, n (%)
  Male 609 (57.9) 263 (60.5) 170 (54.5) 176 (57.9)
  Female 442 (42.1) 172 (39.5) 142 (45.5) 128 (42.1)
Age (years), n (%)
  16–25 12 (1.1) 4 (0.9) 2 (0.6) 6 (2.0)
  26–35 37 (3.5) 16 (3.7) 10 (3.2) 11 (3.6)
  36–45 113 (10.8) 50 (11.5) 27 (8.7) 36 (11.9)
  46–55 181 (17.2) 72 (16.6) 53 (17.0) 56 (18.4)
  56–65 235 (22.4) 87 (20.0) 81 (26.0) 67 (22.0)
  66–75 237 (22.5) 106 (24.4) 68 (21.8) 63 (20.7)
  76–85 173 (16.5) 72 (16.5) 54 (17.3) 47 (15.5)
  ≥86 63 (6.0) 28 (6.4) 17 (5.4) 18 (5.9)
IMD decile, n (%)
  Most deprived
  0≤IMD<10 29 (2.8) 7 (1.6) 9 (2.9) 13 (4.3)
  10≤IMD<20 275 (26.2) 127 (29.2) 65 (20.8) 83 (27.3)
  20≤IMD<30 252 (24.0) 100 (23.0) 85 (27.2) 67 (22.0)
  30≤IMD<40 216 (20.5) 87 (20.0) 68 (21.8) 61 (20.1)
  40≤IMD<50 158 (15.0) 66 (15.2) 51 (16.4) 41 (13.5)
  50≤IMD<60 107 (10.2) 43 (9.9) 28 (9.0) 36 (11.8)
  60≤IMD<70 14 (1.3) 5 (1.1) 6 (1.9) 3 (1.0)
Distance from clinic (km)
  Mean (SD) 2.7 (1.81) 2.69 (1.82) 2.81 (1.84) 2.59 (1.79)
Years registered on 
screening programme
  Mean (SD) 6.0 (2.17) 6.0 (2.12) 5.8 (2.23) 6.0 (2.20)
IDEAS, Incentives in Diabetic Eye Assessment by Screening; IMD, Index of Multiple 
Deprivation.
Table 2  Pairwise comparisons of attendance rate by treatment 
group
Pairwise comparison
risk difference
(95% CI)
relative risk
(95% CI)
Any incentive versus control
(primary aim with a single 
comparison)
−0.03 (−0.06 to 0.01)* 
p=0.02*
0.56 (0.34 to 0.92)* 
p=0.03*
Fixed incentive versus control
(secondary aim using the Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons)
−0.02 (−0.07 to 0.02) 
p=0.19
0.70 (0.35 to 1.39) 
p=0.26
Lottery incentive versus control
(secondary aim using the Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons)
−0.05 (−0.09 to 
0.003)† p=0.01†
0.42 (0.18 to 0.98)† 
p=0.02†
Fixed versus lottery incentive
(secondary aim using the Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons)
0.02 (−0.02 to 0.06) 
p=0.19
1.66 (0.65 to 4.21) 
p=0.27
*Significant at the 0.05 significance level, as a single comparison.
†Significant at the 0.05 significance level, with a Bonferroni multiple comparison 
adjustment for three comparisons.
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the case in the routine screening invite. Yet the impact of these 
limitations on group comparisons should have been minimal due 
to randomisation.
The study was powered based on an anticipated 1% atten-
dance in the control group. Observed attendance was close to 
8%. Even with the higher-than-anticipated attendance, there is 
still more than 80% power to detect a 10% increase in atten-
dance. However, given that attendance rates in the incentive 
groups were lower than in the control group, it seems unlikely 
that the lack of a positive effect was due to chance alone.
The findings of this London-based study may not be general-
isable to other screening programmes in the UK. The population 
in London is ethnically diverse, with 31% of the Westminster 
population having a main language that is not English25 and a 
large variation in health. It is therefore possible that many of 
those in the intervention group did not understand the incentive 
offer, which may have contributed to the lack of positive find-
ings observed. It is unknown whether the findings generalise to 
financial incentives in screening programmes in different settings 
or for other health conditions, given significant variations in 
methods of screening in different conditions, healthcare system, 
the population being studied and details of the incentive scheme.
In conclusion, this is a unique randomised controlled trial of 
the use of financial incentives in a population of patients that 
have repeatedly not attended DES appointments. The design of 
the incentives was based on insights from behavioural economics; 
however, the interventions did not increase screening atten-
dance. There are many factors that predict attendance behaviour, 
which incentives may not address. Individual financial incentives 
should be tested in context before widespread adoption that 
risks financial loss and may possibly adversely affect behaviour.
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Non-attenders versus attenders
p=0.392
Incentive versus control
IMD decile
  0–20, n (%) 556 (52.9) 522 (52.7) 34 (55.7) 19 (55.9) 15 (55.5) 10 (58.8) 5 (50.0)
  30–60, n (%) 495 (47.1) 468 (47.3) 27 (44.3) 15 (44.1) 12 (44.4) 7 (41.2) 5 (50.0)
  p=0.648
Non-attenders versus attenders
p=0.980
Incentive versus control
Distance from clinic (km)
  Mean (SD)
  median
  range
2.7 (1.81)
2.5
0.0–17.5
2.71 (1.80)
2.5
0.0–17.5
2.53 (1.94)
2.0
0.5–10.0
2.94 (2.25)
2.5
0.5–10.0
2.0 (1.32)
2.0
0.5–6.5
2.09 (1.47)
1.5
0.5–6.5
1.85 (1.06)
2.0
0.5–3.5
  p=0.447;
IMD=−0.18
95% CI (−0.65 to 0.29)
Non-attenders versus attenders
p=0.059;
IMD=0.94
95% CI (−0.04 to 1.92)
Incentive versus control
Years registered
  Mean (SD)
  median
  range
5.96 (2.17)
7.0
2–8
5.96 (2.19)
7.0
2–8
5.84 (1.95)
6.0
2–8
5.79 (1.92)
6.0
2–8
5.89 (2.03)
6.0
2–8
5.65 (2.18)
5.0
2–8
6.30 (1.77)
6.5
3–8
  p=0.654;
IMD=−0.13
95% CI (−0.69 to 0.43)
Non-attenders versus attenders
p=0.852;
IMD=−0.95
95% CI (−1.11 to 0.92)
Incentive versus control
IDEAS, Incentives in Diabetic Eye Assessment by Screening; IMD, Indices of Multiple Deprivation.
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